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PRESIDENTIAL EXIT
J.B. RUHL† & JAMES SALZMAN††
The biggest problem that we’re facing right now has to do with
George Bush trying to bring more and more power into the executive
branch and not go through Congress at all, and that’s what I intend to
reverse when I’m president of the United States of America.1
Why is @BarackObama constantly issuing executive orders that
are major power grabs of authority?2
President Trump signed the 30th executive order of his
presidency on Friday, capping off a whirlwind period that produced
more orders in his first 100 days than for any president since Harry
Truman. The rash of executive orders underlines Trump’s focus on
reversing as much of the Obama administration’s policy agenda as he
can.3
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INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Mexico City played host to the second International
Conference on Population, one of many conferences the United
Nations sponsors each year. The Reagan administration raised the
meeting’s profile by announcing a new policy: the U.S. government
would now require foreign groups receiving U.S. funds to certify that
they will not use funds from any source to “perform or actively
promote abortion as a method of family planning.”4 This requirement
became known as the “Mexico City Policy” and stayed in place during
the subsequent administration of President George H.W. Bush.5 Upon
taking office four years later, however, one of President Bill Clinton’s
very first actions was the issuance of a presidential memorandum
reversing the Mexico City Policy.6 When the presidency switched back
to the Republicans, President George W. Bush issued a presidential
memorandum reinstating the policy,7 which was quickly reversed by
President Barack Obama when the Democrats next took the White
House.8 Following this trend, President Donald Trump reinstated the
policy on his third day in office.9

4. LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41360, ABORTION AND FAMILY
PLANNING-RELATED PROVISIONS IN U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LAW AND POLICY 1 (2017).
5. Alexandra Sifferlin, Here’s What the Mexico City Policy Means for Women, TIME (Jan.
23, 2017), http://time.com/4644042/mexico-city-policy-abortion-womens-health [https://perma.cc/
P8DZ-ZMCR].
6. Memorandum on the Mexico City Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 10 (Jan. 22, 1993); see Suzanne
Malveaux, Obama Reverses Abortion-Funding Policy, CNN POL. (Jan. 24, 2009, 12:24 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/23/obama.abortion [https://perma.cc/QUR7-ZFGK].
7. Memorandum on the Restoration of the Mexico City Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 10 (Jan. 22,
2001).
8. Memorandum on Mexico City Policy and Assistance for Voluntary Population Planning,
2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 15 (Jan. 23, 2009).
9. Memorandum on the Mexico City Policy, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 63 (Jan. 23,
2017); see also Alexandra Jaffe, Donald Trump’s First Six Days in Office: Here’s What He’s Done,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/donald-trump-s-firstsix-days-office-here-s-what-n712086 [https://perma.cc/ADR9-PZE2].
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This now predictable dance, with Republican presidents
reinstating the Mexico City Policy and Democratic presidents
rescinding it, is but one example of how presidents treat their
predecessors’ direct actions with every change in administration. The
flow of executive orders, presidential memoranda, proclamations,
determinations, executive agreements, national security directives,
signing statements and other pronouncements emanating from the
early days of every White House administration—what presidency
scholar Phillip Cooper calls presidential direct actions10—serves as a
lightning rod for claims that the president is engaged in a
“powergrab.”11 Not infrequently, however, one president’s grab is
about undoing another president’s grab.
It should be no surprise that each president uses direct actions to
undo many of the initiatives that prior presidents had launched through
their own direct actions. This certainly was the case during the first days
of the Trump administration. In short order, he took aim at President
Obama’s actions on the Paris Agreement on climate change,12 the
Keystone XL oil pipeline permit,13 the offshore drilling ban,14 national
monument designations,15 relations with Cuba,16 the Trans-Pacific
Partnership trade agreement,17 and a whole host of President Obama’s
10. PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 1–2 (2nd ed. 2014).
11. Id. at 2–17.
12. Reuters, President Trump Prepares to Withdraw from Groundbreaking Climate Change
Agreement, Transition Official Says, FORTUNE (Jan. 30, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/30/
donald-trump-paris-agreement-climate-change-withdraw/ [https://perma.cc/XQ4D-FQLV].
13. Memorandum on Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 68 (Jan. 24, 2017); see also Clifford Krauss, U.S., in Reversal, Issues Permit for Keystone Oil
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2017, at A11.
14. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017); see also Juliet Eilperin,
Trump Signs Executive Order to Expand Drilling off America’s Coasts, WASH. POST (Apr. 28,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/04/28/trump-signsexecutive-order-to-expand-offshore-drilling-and-analyze-marine-sanctuaries-oil-and-gaspotential/?utm_term=.86c19b85bf82 [https://perma.cc/9XRR-XDV9].
15. Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017); see also Jennifer A. Dlouhy,
Trump Takes Aim at Western Monuments That May Hold Oil, Coal, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-10/trump-takes-aim-at-western-monumentsthat-may-hold-oil-riches [https://perma.cc/2TSJ-YQAR].
16. Dan Merica, Trump Unveils New Restrictions on Travel, Business with Cuba, CNN POL.
(June
17,
2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/16/politics/trump-cuba-policy/index.html
[https://perma.cc/ 2TSJ-YQAR].
17. Memorandum on Withdrawal of the United States From the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Negotiations Agreement, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 64 (Jan. 23, 2017); see also Eric
Bradner, Trump’s TPP Withdrawal: 5 Things to Know, CNN POL. (Jan. 23, 2017, 2:52 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/23/politics/trump-tpp-things-to-know/index.html
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direct-action initiatives.18
But President Trump is by no means unique in this regard, for
many of his predecessors did the same to their predecessors’ direct
actions.19 The reality is that “[t]he act of changing or even terminating
executive orders is a common practice that is exercised by the White
House,”20 so much so that it has become one of the principal strategic
political uses of direct actions by recent presidents.21 For example,
while President Trump has been characterized as intent on dismantling
Obama-era direct actions, President Obama’s first executive order
revoked an executive order that President George W. Bush had issued
regarding presidential records disclosure,22 fulfilling just one of
Obama’s several campaign promises to reverse course.23 President
Obama followed through with numerous other direct actions designed
to “sweep away Bush policies.”24
Hence the media focus on a new president’s “[f]irst 100 days in
office.”25 Part of the media’s attention is on new initiatives, but much
also focuses on the image of a new president tearing up a predecessor’s
executive orders (ironically, through new executive orders), often
accompanied with the fiery rhetoric of a new sheriff in town.
In short, presidents, like Congress and administrative agencies,
routinely engage in exit to reverse prior administrations’ initiatives and
policies, and when one president has made policy through a direct
action, the most effective way for a successor to undo it is through
another direct action. Although this practice has been a robust feature
of the presidency for many decades and by all appearances will
[https://perma.cc/TA6N-3XZN].
18. Presidents also use direct actions to order an agency to undo rules the agency adopted
during a prior administration. President Trump’s first official act, with respect to the Affordable
Care Act, was one such agency-facing direct action. See Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg.
8351 (Jan. 24, 2017). As explained infra, we treat this type of action as distinct from one in which
a president uses a direct action to undo another president’s direct action.
19. See COOPER, supra note 10, at 33, 68, 118 (discussing the use of direct actions by
Presidents Obama, George W. Bush, and Clinton to undo initiatives of their predecessors). For
further discussion of presidential use of direct actions, see infra Part I.
20. ADAM L. WARBER, EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND THE MODERN PRESIDENCY:
LEGISLATING FROM THE OVAL OFFICE 46 (2006).
21. COOPER, supra note 10, at 90–95.
22. Id. at 33.
23. Id. at 19.
24. Id. at 119.
25. Kevin Liptak, History of Measuring Presidents’ First 100 Days, CNN POL. (Apr. 23,
2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/23/politics/donald-trump-history-100-days/index.html
[https://perma.cc/AEE2-YHDC].

RUHL AND SALZMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

PRESIDENTIAL EXIT

4/26/2018 7:14 PM

1733

continue, presidency scholar Adam Warber aptly observed over a
decade ago that “[t]he president’s power to revoke, supersede, and
amend executive orders has managed to escape the research agenda of
presidential scholars.”26 As political scientist Sharece Thrower more
recently observed in her 2017 study of executive-order longevity,
“there exists a facet of presidential power left unexplored—the power
to change or overturn previous orders.”27 A full understanding of
presidential behavior requires attention to this practice, she contends,
because “unlike other policies, presidents can easily alter these orders
without the same immediate constraints faced by the other branches of
government.”28
We believe these scholars are on target, and we admit to the same
myopia they have exposed. In our 2015 article, Regulatory Exit,29 we
examined the design and use of exit strategies in the administrative
state.30 From prenuptial agreements to venture capital investment
agreements, exit strategies are ubiquitous in life’s relationships. Exit is
an inevitable feature of governance as well, and its challenges arise in
a wider range of activities than is commonly recognized. Regulatory
exit is often by design: entitlement benefits end when income limits are
exceeded, employment regulations drop off when employee numbers
fall below thresholds, and emission regulations are relaxed as pollutant
levels fall. In other instances, regulatory exit is much messier, as
Congress or an agency reexamines a statute or rule for amendment or
perhaps even outright elimination.
Exit lurks in the background of the administrative state—the
question is whether it should figure more prominently in the
foreground, as a matter of intentional design when new regulatory or
benefits regimes are being hatched. We argued that it should, set out a
framework for four types of exit strategies, showed which are most
appropriate for promoting certain behaviors by public and private
26. WARBER, supra note 20, at 61. For full descriptions and comparisons of the acts of
amending, superseding, and revoking prior direct actions, see id. at 48–51.
27. Sharece Thrower, To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive
Order Longevity, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 642, 643 (2017). Warber and Thrower both argue that this
practice is an important dimension of the presidency deserving far more attention than it has
received. Warber urges that “if we are to understand the unique characteristics of executive
orders and apply sophisticated tools to analyze them, scholars must realize that there is a degree
of interdependency that exists among executive orders. That is, the fate of every directive is
dependent on the future policy actions of the president.” WARBER, supra note 20, at 61.
28. Thrower, supra note 27, at 644.
29. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (2015).
30. Id. at 1299–1301.
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actors, and examined the challenges that each type of exit raises. This
type of analysis, we argued, helps explain the shape administrative
programs can and should take.
In all respects, however, our focus was on legislatures and
agencies—on legislative exit and administrative exit. We left out the
role of presidential exit because it did not seem as important. Given
the concerns that have been raised about the Trump administration’s
rapid and sweeping reversal of President Obama’s direct actions,
though, this omission appears more and more as a major gap in legal
and policy scholarship. Other presidents have surely made use of exit
strategies at the beginning of their terms, but the Trump
administration’s use of exit seems qualitatively different. Indeed, most
of his high-profile actions to date have involved some form of exit.
While there is a robust literature on specific types of presidential
direct actions, there is no examination of direct actions as part of a
broader exit strategy.31 This Article closes that gap by extending our
analysis of regulatory exit to presidential direct action, and to examine
the different types of presidential exit and how they are employed. Part
I explains the exit framework we set out in our 2015 article, describing
each of the four categories with illustrative examples. Part II reviews
the range of presidential direct actions and the scholarship on how
presidents have employed them to exit from prior presidents’ direct
actions. Part III joins these together, mapping the exit framework onto
presidential exit in four separate case studies that illustrate the exit
categories. Part IV analyzes how Congress (when it delegates direct
action authority to the president) and the president (when exercising
direct action authority) can influence and constrain successor
presidential exit. Part IV also considers the innovative strategy of
“symbolic exit.” This has been the Trump administration’s signature
approach of announcing exit but not following through, leaving it to
Congress, agencies, or future presidential action to make the exit
complete. This is as much a political strategy as a legal strategy and
forces us to rethink the nature of exit in the administrative state.
I. UNDERSTANDING EXIT
In our 2015 article, we examined the theory and practice of exit

31. Even Warber and Thrower, while forging a new focus on presidential exit, do not explore
it from the standpoint of how to systematically design exit strategies for presidential direct actions.
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strategies in the administrative state.32 Despite the central and
necessary role of exit, it had been an undertheorized area of legal
scholarship. Focusing on exit reveals foundational questions not
usually asked in administrative law scholarship: What is the range of
exit strategies? Which are most appropriate for promoting certain
behaviors of public and private actors, and which are most appropriate
for preventing perverse behaviors?
Focusing on congressional and agency action, we defined exit as
the intentional, significant reduction in governmental intervention
initiated at a particular time under specified processes and conditions.
In order to understand exit as a general phenomenon, we proposed
assessing its character along two dimensions. The first dimension
measures when the exit design decision is made. Ex ante design
decisions occur at the front end of the intervention, during the design
of the program itself and prior to its implementation. Ex post exit
design occurs after the intervention has begun. The second dimension
tracks the clarity of conditions necessary for exit to occur, regardless of
whether they are designed ex ante or ex post—how clear are the exit
requirements? This dimension runs from transparent to opaque.
In ex ante settings, the process and conditions for exit are
established before engagement, as in “sunsetting” provisions which
determine the time a program will automatically expire unless there is
explicit reauthorization.33 As the exit date approaches, there may be
sufficient political support to prevent exit from happening, but it
requires action on the part of those who wish to block the exit path. In
ex post settings, the process and conditions for exit are established after
engagement has commenced. An example of this would be California’s
deregulation of wholesale electricity pricing.34 Only decades after
ratemaking was implemented did policymakers decide to stop this
practice.
The transparent-opaque dimension measures how difficult it is to
determine whether the conditions for exit have been satisfied. To put
it another way, how clearly mapped is the pathway to exit? Are the exit
requirements objective and clear or subjective and murky? To a certain

32. This section is adapted from Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 29, at 1312–25.
33. For a critique of sunsetting, see Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 1007, 1007–08 (2011).
34. Robert B. Martin, III, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust Enforcement in
the California Electricity Crisis, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 275 (2003) (discussing the deregulation of
electricity pricing in California).
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extent, the transparent/opaque distinction tracks the well-known
difference between rules and standards.35 In transparent exit
conditions, determining how exit is accomplished is made simple
through rule-like thresholds and requirements. In child welfare
programs, for example, once you reach the age of eighteen, you are
out.36 For opaque exit, determining the conditions for departure is
more difficult and costly given the standard-based approach. For
example, delisting a species from the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
involves a subjective assessment of the species’ “recovery” and
demands a high evidentiary burden.37
Combining the two dimensions of timing and clarity allows us to
create a simple two-by-two matrix, shown in the figure below. Each cell
represents a distinct category of exit.

Transparent

Opaque

Ex Ante

Mapped Exit
Sunsetting of assault
weapons ban

Uncertain Exit
Endangered species
delisting

Ex Post

Adaptive Exit
California electricity
market deregulation

Messy Exit
Efforts to halt the
Affordable Care Act

Mapped exit strategies generally share a number of features. The
conditions required for exit are objective or easy to determine. If the
conditions are met, exit is often automatic. Thus mapped exit often
operates as a binary on/off switch. There is a burden of proof on the
regulated party to prove that the conditions have been met; this and

35. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 166–67
(2015). Parchomovsky & Stein explain that “[r]ules come in handy for individuals trying to figure
out whether their contemplated conduct is prohibited or permitted,” whereas “[t]he same kind of
ex ante clarity is not readily available under standards, whose precise implications for a given
course of action are determined by a court or an agency only after the fact.” Id.
36. See Keely A. Magyar, Betwixt and Between but Being Booted Nonetheless: A
Developmental Perspective on Aging Out of Foster Care, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 557, 559 (2006)
(discussing the negative impacts of ending child welfare programs at age eighteen).
37. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2012).
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the burden of proof on the regulator to rebut exit are both clearly
spelled out. The assault weapons ban, for example, was designed to
sunset on September 13, 2004, unless Congress renewed it.38
Mapped exit is easy to assess and implement. It should also ensure
lower transaction costs for determining eligibility criteria—the actual
costs of exiting could be high but the clarity of the conditions for exit
allows program participants to identify early on the costs of exit and to
adapt their behavior accordingly. This provides a classic example of
bargaining in the shadow of the law.39
In uncertain exit, exit has been accounted for up front but the
specific conditions for exit are difficult to determine in practice. In
these settings, subjective standards make the exit decision dependent
on a discretionary judgment. In regulatory contexts, there exists a high
burden of proof on the regulated party to obtain exit approval from the
agency and, often, a correspondingly high cost on the regulated party
to meet the conditions. In the practice of delisting a species under the
Endangered Species Act, for example, this ex ante strategy imposes a
subjective standard and requires a high burden of proof.40 A series of
five standards must be met to ensure that the species has recovered
enough to no longer merit protection. Uncertain exit is often used
when the consequences of exit are complicated, making clear rules
infeasible.
Adaptive exit occurs when clear standards are established for exit
after the program has already commenced. It may be the case that it
appeared too difficult to predict the conditions appropriate for exit at
the time of program creation and so exit decisions were intentionally
pushed off, assuming agencies would learn over time as the program
develops. Or it may be the case that the demand for exit is only
recognized after creation of the program, when experience makes clear
that the original mechanism or conditions for exit were inadequate,
making exit either too easy or too difficult. Deregulation provides the
bluntest example of adaptive exit, where the government simply
departs from a formerly regulated area.
The last category, messy exit, occurs the least frequently, which is

38. VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN: LEGAL
ISSUES 3 (2013); see Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103322, § 110105, 108 Stat. 1996, 2000 (1994).
39. See Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 228 (1982).
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1).
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probably a good thing. Here, there are no ex ante conditions for exit,
either because at program inception the issues were too contested and
too politicized to consider ex ante exit strategies without undermining
the supportive coalition, or because the program was designed to not
allow exit. As with adaptive exit, the demand for exit is recognized only
after creation of the program. The difference is that, with messy exit,
the path to exit is unclear. This has clearly been playing out in the
drama over the contorted efforts to end the Affordable Care Act. At
the time of passage, it was highly contested whether government
should even enter the area and there was no discussion of exit. Years
later, it is still unclear how exit will be possible.
We apply this model in Part III to presidential exit, showing that
the categories of mapped, uncertain, adaptive and messy exit help
explain how presidents back out of predecessors’ direct-action policies.
First, though, Part II lays a foundation by reviewing scholarship on the
mechanics and history of presidential exit.
II. REVOKING, AMENDING, AND SUPERSEDING PRESIDENTIAL
DIRECT ACTIONS
Presidents take many actions and make many statements, not all
of which are intended as official exercises of power. A president might
frame policy goals in a press conference, a cabinet meeting, or a letter
to Congress, without purporting to call into play presidential authority.
Even when a president does mean to exercise authority, other
institutions may be necessary to finish the act, such as when an agency
must promulgate a rule to implement a president’s policy wishes, or
when Congress must confirm a judicial appointment. But there are also
many instances when presidents exert some level of direct legal
authority, pursuant to either inherent constitutional powers or
statutory delegation, that does not require action or consent by any
other institution. This Article is about those presidential direct actions;
more specifically, it is about whether and how one president can exit
from a predecessor’s direct action through yet another direct action
revoking, amending, or superseding the original. In this Part, we lay the
foundation for exploring that question by outlining the major forms of
presidential direct action and summarizing the extensive history of
presidential exit.
As an entry point to the theme, Phillip Cooper’s book, By Order
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of the President,41 published in its second edition in 2014, is a masterful
analysis of presidential direct actions. It works though each type of
direct action, describing its features and uses and assessing its changing
place in history.42 Cooper provides a deep account of six major directaction instruments. We describe them below and add a seventh.43
Executive Orders: Considered the most formal and prominent of
the direct actions, executive orders are written directives to
government officials and agencies of the executive branch, instructing
them to take action, stop a specified activity, change policy or
management direction, or delegate authority.44 The U.S. Department
of State (State Department) began numbering executive orders in
1907, and since the Federal Register Act of 1935, executive orders are
almost always required to be published in the Federal Register.45
Presidential Memoranda: Cooper refers to these direct actions as
“executive orders by another name,” in the sense that “[a]s a practical
matter, the memorandum is now being used as the equivalent of an
executive order, but without meeting the legal requirements for an
41. COOPER, supra note 10.
42. See id. at 17. For additional background on presidential direct actions from policy
scholars, see GRAHAM G. DODDS, TAKE UP YOUR PEN: UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL
DIRECTIVES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3–4 (2013); WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT
PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION, at xiv (2003); KENNETH R.
MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 31–33
(2001). Legal scholars have, for the most part, not focused on presidential direct actions. One
notable exception is Professor Kevin Stack’s series of articles exploring the exercise and judicial
review of presidential direct actions implementing statutorily delegated powers. See Kevin M.
Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1171 (2009);
Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
263, 263 (2006); Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 539 (2005)
[hereinafter Stack, The Statutory President]. Several legal academics and practitioners have voiced
concerns over presidential abuse of direct actions. See, e.g., Tara L. Branum, President or King?
The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 2 (2002); John
C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the
Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 345 (2010); Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive
Orders and Other Presidential Directives, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 267, 297–316 (2001).
43. Depending on how one classifies them, there are almost thirty different types of
presidential direct actions and their boundaries are fuzzy at best. DODDS, supra note 42, at 5–10.
Regardless of how one classifies them, it is almost always the case that many actors from within
the White House, and often from agencies as well, are involved in the negotiation and drafting of
direct actions for the president’s final say and signature. See Andrew Rudalevige, The
Contemporary Presidency: Executive Orders and Presidential Unilateralism, 42 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 138 (2012).
44. COOPER, supra note 10, at 21.
45. Id. at 22; see John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Executive Orders: Washington-Trump,
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/orders.php [https://perma.cc/
2F4B-XBUG].
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executive order,” such as numbering and publishing.46 Modern
presidents have routinely used both executive orders and memoranda,
and the conventional view is that there is no substantive difference in
legal force or effect.47
Proclamations: These instruments, which must be published in the
Federal Register, state conditions, trigger implementation of laws, and
recognize symbolic events by, for example, declaring a natural disaster
or declaring a day or week of recognition.48 Whereas executive orders
and memoranda are generally directed to federal agencies and officials
within the executive branch, proclamations are generally aimed
outward, to foreign, state, local, and private institutions.49 But that is
not always the case—presidents have used proclamations to declare
federal public lands and waters as national monuments under the
Antiquities Act.50
Presidential Determinations: Although similar to presidential
memoranda, presidential determinations generally are focused on
foreign policy and are numbered chronologically by fiscal year.51 They
are usually made pursuant to statutes that require the president “to
make findings concerning the status of a foreign country or some
activity in the foreign policy field,” which then triggers some action or
other condition under the statute.52
National Security Directives: These are formal notifications to
government agencies or officials regarding national security decisions
to coordinate military policy, foreign policy, intelligence policy, or
other security policies, such as those managed through the National
Security Council.53
Executive Agreements: Cooper describes executive agreements as
“the substance of a treaty without the constitutional process.”54 Indeed,
the State Department defines two kinds of international agreements,
treaties and executive agreements, the latter being “other international
agreements” that the president enters pursuant to a treaty, legislation,
46. COOPER, supra note 10, at 115, 120.
47. Id. at 120–22.
48. Id. at 172.
49. See id. at 173 (“[O]rders are directed to government officials (internal), while
proclamations are aimed at those outside of government (external).”).
50. See infra Part III.C.
51. COOPER, supra note 10, at 123.
52. Id. at 123–24.
53. Id. at 208.
54. Id. at 282.
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or simply “the constitutional authority of the president.”55
Signing Statements: These are written comments a president issues
at the time of signing legislation. Although most signing statements
merely comment briefly and favorably on the bill signed, the more
controversial statements express concerns and limitations. For
example, the statement might claim that the legislation infringes on the
constitutional powers of the presidency, announce interpretations of
the legislation’s language, or instruct executive-branch officials how to
implement the new law, including by ignoring it.56
Tweets: The rising use by politicians of social media as a channel
of communication has raised questions regarding the status of
President Trump’s frequent tweets. Cooper did not include tweets in
his account of presidential direct actions—until recently, no one could
be blamed for thinking a tweet is just a tweet—but they warrant their
own treatment given how important a role they have come to play in
the Trump administration. For example, former White House Press
Secretary Sean Spicer somewhat circularly explained the status of
President Trump’s tweets, stating that “[t]he President is the President
of the United States, so they’re considered official statements by the
President of the United States.”57 We take him at his word, as did a
panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals when ruling on the socalled “travel ban,” pointing to a Trump tweet as tantamount to an
official presidential “assessment.”58 Indeed, the Department of Justice
recently declared in litigation that the tweets are “official statements
of the President of the United States.”59 Part IV shows that President
Trump has used tweets to shape a new style of presidential exit we call
symbolic exit, which we contend must be taken seriously
notwithstanding how different they are in form from the traditional
categories of presidential direct action.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 325.
57. Elizabeth Landers, White House: Trump’s Tweets are ‘Official Statements,’ CNN POL.
(June 6, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/politics/trump-tweets-official-statements/
index.html [https:// perma.cc/HFB8-6R44].
58. See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 773 n.14 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing a tweet when noting
that “the President recently confirmed his assessment that it is the ‘countries’ that are inherently
dangerous, rather than the 180 million individual nationals of those countries who are barred from
entry under the President’s ‘travel ban’” (citing Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 6:20 PM)), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (mem.),
vacated, 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017).
59. Defendants’ Supplemental Submission and Further Response to Plaintiffs’ Post-Briefing
Notices at 2, James Madison Project v. DOJ, 208 F. Supp. 3d 265 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-1307).
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These and other presidential direct actions operate in an
environment driven by two default rules. The first is that,
notwithstanding their remarkably unencumbered promulgation
process, they remain in effect through a change in administration.60
This means that an incoming president is “inheriting a large body of
executive orders and other pronouncements.”61 This pileup of direct
actions is, therefore, in a sense binding on successors.62 The second
default rule, however, is that direct actions have this effect only “until
subsequent presidential action is taken,”63 which usually is through
another direct action amending, superseding, or revoking the original.64
Easy come, easy go.
While great attention has been focused on President Trump’s
efforts to amend, supersede, or revoke a prior direct action, it is
important to recognize that presidential exit has a long and rich
history—Trump is by no means an outlier. We recounted the history of
the Mexico City Policy and other examples of presidential exit in the
Introduction. But how often does it really happen, and under what
conditions?
To measure the frequency of presidential exit over time, political
science scholar Adam Warber systematically quantified and classified
executive orders issued from President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first
term through President Clinton’s second term. Warber divided the
executive orders into three categories: symbolic orders designed to
accomplish ceremonial and similar tasks, such as declaring National
Boating Week; routine orders for managing housekeeping matters,
such as establishing the order of official delegations in a federal agency;
and policy orders issued to initiate or reverse major policy, such as the
Mexico City Policy orders.65 He found that policy orders accounted for
just over one-third of all executive orders issued in the study period,66
but that they were the primary target of subsequent changes by

60. COOPER, supra note 10, at 2; see WARBER, supra note 20, at 46.
61. COOPER, supra note 10, at 2.
62. DODDS, supra note 42, at 10; WARBER, supra note 20, at 46.
63. COOPER, supra note 10, at 120.
64. DODDS, supra note 42, at 10; WARBER, supra note 20, at 46.
65. WARBER, supra note 20, at 39.
66. Most orders fall into the routine category and a small portion into the symbolic category.
Routine orders constituted the substantial majority of orders for Warber’s study period (59.7
percent) and symbolic orders were a small percentage (2.8 percent). Policy orders averaged 37.5
percent, but fluctuated from as high as 73.9 percent in the Clinton administration to as low as 22.2
percent in the Eisenhower administration. Id. at 39 tbl.2.1.
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successor presidents. Indeed, “[p]residents generally changed between
15 and 39 major policy directives each year” through the study period.67
Professor Sharece Thrower’s more recent study of over six
thousand executive orders issued between 1937 and 2013 largely
confirms Warber’s assessment.68 Thrower does not differentiate
between symbolic, routine, and policy orders, but does differentiate
between amending, superseding, and revoking. She finds that onequarter of all executive orders issued in her study period were fully
revoked and that another quarter were substantially amended or
superseded, meaning roughly half of the executive orders were the
target of successor change.69
In short, “beginning with [President Richard] Nixon, chief
executives have been active in altering and rescinding executive orders
that were issued by previous administrations.”70 In fact, President
Trump’s pace puts him at the back of the pack. Based on our analysis,
during his first year in office he revoked only eight substantive policy
executive orders and four substantive policy presidential memoranda.71
Both Warber and Thrower also explore why and when presidents
alter predecessor actions and what practical political considerations
constrain the practice. Although it is difficult for Congress and the
courts to monitor and control presidential direct actions generally,
Warber argues that “[p]residents must constantly be aware of their
political environment and exercise caution when influencing the policy
process” by changing an existing executive order.72 Thus, although
“[t]heoretically, the president’s power to veto or change existing orders

67. Id. at 57. By contrast, President Jimmy Carter led the pack at over fifty-four policy orders
per year. Id. Not surprisingly, Warber found that very few symbolic orders are amended,
superseded, or revoked—an average of fewer than two per year over his study period. Id. at 56
tbl.2.5.
68. Thrower, supra note 27, at 654.
69. Id. at 644 (“[O]f the 6,158 executive orders . . . 18% are amended, 8% are superseded,
and 25% are revoked.”).
70. WARBER, supra note 20, at 16.
71. We reviewed each of President Trump’s executive orders and presidential memoranda,
looking for instances in which he expressly revoked a prior direct action that had substantive
policy effect. In addition to his presidential memorandum reversing the Mexico City Policy, see
Exec. Order No. 13,688, 80 Fed. Reg. 3451 (Jan 16, 2015); Exec. Order No. 13,782, 82 Fed. Reg.
15,607 (Mar. 27, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017); Exec. Order
No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (Apr. 28, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463
(Aug. 15, 2017); and Exec. Order No. 13,812, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,367 (Sept. 29, 2017).
72. WARBER, supra note 20, at 48. For executive orders, “[t]he political costs are greater
when a president tinkers with a controversial directive that becomes salient among the mass
media and public.” Id. at 55.
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is absolute,” Warber warns that “[p]residents seeking to change
controversial orders risk entangling themselves in political and public
relations conflicts.”73
On the other hand, Warber observes, the political costs of
tinkering with prior orders are likely lower than the costs of revising
federal agency regulations. Public participation and congressional
oversight are nonexistent in the executive-order context, whereas
agency regulations are subject to oversight mechanisms such as public
notice and comment and the Congressional Review Act.74 Thus it is no
surprise that both Democratic and Republican presidents change more
orders of opposing-party predecessors than same-party predecessors,
with Republican presidents considerably more aggressive in this
respect over Warber’s full study period.75 The presidents who lead in
this behavior, however, are a more recent bipartisan collection of
Presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, suggesting once again
that the pace of presidential exit has ramped up since President Nixon
took office.76
Thrower’s more rigorous empirical study of executive orders
found that most changes to executive orders take place in the first ten
years of an order’s life, with revocation occurring on average at
thirteen years.77 Focusing on revocation, which is the most decisive and
unambiguous form of presidential exit, Thrower advanced three
hypotheses: that orders originally issued under ideological discord will
resist revocation longer because they reflect policy compromises; that
orders based on stronger statutory authority enjoy longer lives; and
that presidents are more likely to revoke orders issued by political
adversaries.78 Based on her detailed statistical models, she found these
three hypotheses mostly to be true—greater ideological division
between the issuing president and a successor increased the hazard of
revocation, but this effect was dampened when the order was based on
strong statutory authority or involved foreign policy.79 Moreover,
orders issued during a divided government enjoy a lower risk of

73. Id. at 53.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 59–60 tbl.2.7.
76. Id. at 59.
77. Thrower, supra note 27, at 645 fig.1. It takes “an average of 5 years until an order is first
amended or superseded and 13 years until revocation.” Id. at 644.
78. Id. at 643.
79. Id. at 653.
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revocation over time,80 and presidents are less likely to revoke prior
orders during election years or when they experience low political
capital.81
Warber and Thrower thus generally agree that presidents face
practical political constraints when tinkering with predecessors’ direct
actions—while legally “easy go,” it may not always be so easy
politically. Part III examines several such instances, and Part IV
extrapolates from those to develop a more general model of strategies
for constraining presidential exit.
III. PRESIDENTIAL EXIT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
We have set out a model for understanding the different types of
regulatory exit and showed that presidential exit has been happening
for a long time, frequently and consistently, regardless of the political
party. We now bring these together to develop a theoretical framework
explaining presidential exit and apply it to a series of case studies.
Our definition for exit in our 2015 article was the “intentional,
significant reduction in governmental intervention initiated at a
particular time under specified processes and conditions.”82 These
conditions do not map well onto presidential exit, however, as the
nature of presidential exit is very different from that of agency and
congressional exit in several respects.
First, in contrast to other forms of exit that involve multiple actors,
presidential exit requires only one actor. This is an especially salient
difference because, although the president might be one actor in
regulatory exit, the president is never able to unilaterally decide when
or how to make a regulatory exit. In legislative exit, the president plays
a role through the enactment process; in agency exit, through executive
oversight of agencies, including using direct actions to order agency
action. In these interactions, the president can attempt to influence
how exit is designed according to our model categories, and can
attempt to push the other institutions toward or away from initiating
exit. The president could, for example, veto legislation that does not
adequately plan exit or push an agency to reverse policies and
regulations leftover from the prior administration. In both realms,
however, the president must work with Congress or the agency to steer

80. Id. at 650.
81. Id. at 652.
82. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 29, at 1302.
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legislative or administrative exit. With presidential exit, by contrast,
there usually is no required intermediary or partner. Only one actor is
needed to enact presidential exit, and that actor is the president him or
herself.
Another difference is institutional transition. Although the
political-party leaders controlling a chamber of Congress might flip in
an election, congressional succession is gradual, and there are always
members of a prior Congress carrying on into a new Congress. And
while presidents can appoint new heads of agencies, Senate approval is
required, and turnover in the vast staffs of many federal agencies can
take place at glacial speed. By contrast, the president is one person—
when a new president takes office, the singular predecessor and all of
the White House staff leave office all at once, period. This is why there
is so much media focus on the first hundred days of a new
administration—the assumption is that the president can do something
big quickly.
Taken together, this means that the speed of presidential exit is
much more rapid than legislative or administrative exit. For Congress
to exit, it must hold hearings and pass legislation. And the president
can then still veto the statute. Agencies have more freedom, but the
State Farm doctrine limits the extent to which agencies can exit many
programs, requiring new rulemaking to reverse existing rules.83 That is
the main reason the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has had
so much difficulty exiting the Clean Power Plan.84
To reflect these differences, our definition for presidential exit is
broad: presidential exit occurs when a president uses a direct action to
substantially reverse the policy or legal position established by a prior
president’s direct action. This would include the Mexico City Policy,
with each administration from an opposing party reversing the prior
administration’s policy. It would not include amendments that
represent incremental shifts in policy. For example, cost-benefit
analysis of proposed regulation was first established by an executive
order from the Reagan administration.85 President Clinton issued a
new executive order, requiring benefits to justify instead of exceeding
83. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(holding that the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard applies to
agency actions rescinding regulations).
84. Noah Feldman, Opinion, Gorsuch Could Sway Climate Policy. Prepare to Be Surprised.,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-03-29/
gorsuch-could-sway-climate-policy-prepare-to-be-surprised [https://perma.cc/PFY3-TM95].
85. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982).
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costs.86 In his executive order, President George W. Bush expanded the
purview of cost-benefit analysis, requiring it not only for major rules
but also for significant regulatory guidance.87 President Obama, in turn,
issued his own executive order on cost-benefit analysis.88 The key point
is that none of these successive amendments fundamentally changed
the original requirement of cost-benefit analysis. Thus these would not
be considered examples of presidential exit.89
With this definition in hand, the matrix developed for regulatory
exit can be applied to presidential exit. Recall that there are four
categories. For presidential exit they play out as follows:
In mapped exit, the path for exit is clear for subsequent presidents
at the time the original policy is implemented. This is the case for the
Mexico City Policy and, in fact, for most direct actions. The subsequent
president can simply countermand the prior policy through a stroke of
the pen, with no justification needed. Easy come, easy go. But mapped
exit can be more complicated than that. We explore an example of this
in the context of the Paris Climate Agreement.
In uncertain exit, the path for exit by a subsequent president is
known at the time the original policy is implemented, but the standard
is opaque. The president has the power to exit but only if he meets a
standard, and it is not obvious whether the standard is met. We explore
this in the context of the Keystone XL oil pipeline permit.
In adaptive exit, the path for exit by a subsequent president is not
known at the time the original policy is implemented, but the standard
is transparent. No one knew the rules for exit at the outset because no
one thought about the possibility of exit. We explore this in the context
of shrinking national monuments.
Messy exit occurs when the government declares exit from an
existing policy that has no clear exit path because exit was not
considered at the time of its creation and the standards for exit are
opaque. The ongoing debacle of the attempts to rescind the Affordable
Care Act provides a clear example. Strictly speaking, however, messy
exit is inapplicable in the presidential context because the default rule

86. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994).
87. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (2007).
88. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012).
89. Indeed, Cooper refers to this series of orders as an example of “the decree inertia
principle: the tendency of a line of executive orders of a particular type to continue from
administration to administration and grow in size and complexity in the process.” COOPER, supra
note 10, at 93.
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is that, absent congressionally imposed constraints in the case of
statutorily delegated direct-action authority,90 the president’s exit path
is clear at the outset—simply rescind the prior direct action. In place of
messy exit, therefore, we propose the variant of messed-up exit, where
the president transforms what should have been straightforward exit
into an ex post, opaque standard. We explore this in the context of the
transgender military ban.

Transparent

Opaque

Ex Ante

Mapped Exit
Paris Climate
Agreement

Uncertain Exit
Keystone XL oil
pipeline permit

Ex Post

Adaptive Exit
Shrinking National
Monuments

Messed-up Exit
Transgender Military
Ban

A. Mapped Exit—The Paris Agreement
On December 12, 2015, to great acclaim, over 195 nations adopted
the Paris Agreement.91 This was a heady moment of reinvigoration for
international negotiations addressing climate change. Just five years
earlier, plenary negotiations in Copenhagen had broken down,
producing a last-minute informal agreement among the heads of state
of the United States, Brazil, China, India, and South Africa.92 The rest
of the countries were so angry about the ad hoc process that the only
90. We discuss this phenomenon in Part IV.A.
91. Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS, http://unfccc.int/paris
_agreement/items/9444.php [https://perma.cc/57GM-4YGK]; see also United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Dec. 12,
2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement], http://unfccc.int/files/home/application/pdf/paris
_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF56-CJEL].
92. Darren Samuelsohn, Obama Negotiates ‘Copenhagen Accord’ With Senate Climate Fight
in Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2009), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/cwire/
2009/12/21/21climatewire-obama-negotiates-copenhagen-accord-with-senat-6121.html?page
wanted=all [https://perma.cc/2RPK-Z9SM]; Juliet Eilperin & Anthony Faiola, Climate Deal Falls
Short of Key Goals, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/ 18/AR2009121800637.html [https://perma.cc/NU3X-VSRF].
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consensus achieved was that the countries would “take note” of the
Copenhagen Accord.93 There were serious concerns that international
climate negotiations were doomed to failure and that a more promising
path lay in plurilateral and bilateral arrangements.94
The success of the negotiations in Paris was due in large part to
intense diplomatic efforts leading up to the meeting. At the
preparatory conference in Durban in 2011, for example, the delegates
agreed to develop an agreement to be adopted at the conference of
parties in Paris in 2015 and to take effect by 2020.95 The Durban text
seemed odd at first glance; it committed the parties “to develop a
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal
force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.”96 The purpose of
this convoluted text would become clear in Paris, where U.S.
negotiators were very careful to avoid any text that might require
ratification by the Senate.
The success was also due to the nature of the Paris commitments.
Parties agreed to submit Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change secretariat, periodically meeting to review progress and set
new domestic goals.97 This bottom-up “pledge and review” process
marked a sharp break from the top-down “targets and timetables”
approach of the Kyoto Protocol, which had relied on national goals
determined by international negotiation.98 The INDCs were
determined by each country and best suited to their particular situation
and preferences. At the time of the Paris Agreement’s adoption,
leaders from around the globe hailed the reengagement of the
international community in concerted efforts to reduce greenhouse
gas.99

93. John M. Broder, Remember the Copenhagen Accord?, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2010),
https://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/remember-the-copenhagen-accord [https://perma.cc/
A4T9-BKCU].
94. David Doniger, The Copenhagen Accord: A Big Step Forward, HUFFINGTON POST (May
25,
2011),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-doniger/the-copenhagen-accord-a-b_b_
402299.html [https://perma.cc/UV8C-JT3Z].
95. Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced
Action, Dec. 1/CP.17, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012).
96. Id. para. 2.
97. Paris Agreement, supra note 91, art. 4, para. 2.
98. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
99. Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2015, at A1.
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Opponents of the Obama administration’s climate change efforts
argued that U.S. adoption of the Paris Agreement was unlawful
because it lacked the advice and consent of the Senate. Any agreement
resulting from Paris, they charged, was a treaty and would require
ratification.100 With a Republican majority in the Senate, of course,
ratification would have been nigh impossible. It was this threat that had
led negotiators in Durban to provide such an expansive description of
the result in Paris. It also explained why there had been a last-minute
amendment prior to adoption of the Paris Agreement. U.S. negotiators
had been very careful to wordsmith the Paris Agreement text so that
commitments read as “should” rather than “shall”; final adoption was
actually held up so that a last-minute amendment could replace the
word “shall” with “should” in text they had overlooked.101
With this background, State Department lawyers claimed that
ratification was unnecessary because the Senate had already ratified
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992.102 Because
the President had already been granted authority to comply with the
UNFCCC, adoption of the Paris Agreement required no Senate action.
It was simply a means to implement the UNFCCC and did not add any
commitments. As a result, the U.S. agreement in Paris was
characterized as an executive agreement.103
As described in Part I, executive agreements have long been a
common feature of U.S. statecraft, constituting over 90 percent of
binding international agreements.104 The legal basis for this was set out
in Circular 175 in 1955.105 While treating the Paris Agreement as an
executive agreement made it easier for the United States to join, it
equally made it easier for a subsequent president to exit.
100. Sam Mulopulos, Why the Paris Climate Agreement Is a Treaty, HUFFINGTON POST (May
11, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/young-professionals-in-foreign-policy/why-the-parisclimate-agr_b_9914606.html [https://perma.cc/KYW8-VZLQ].
101. John Vidal, How a ‘Typo’ Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/dec/16/how-a-typo-nearly-derailedthe-paris-climate-deal [https://perma.cc/Q43D-ANPU].
102. Dean Scott & Anthony Adragna, Senate Republicans Mull Options for Review of U.S.
Participation in Paris Climate Talks, BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2015), https://www.bna.com/senaterepublicans-mull-n17179926673/ [https://perma.cc/F8YX-QYAR].
103. Id.
104. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 40 (Comm. Print 2001); see
MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 4–9 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL32528.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3AF-PC24].
105. GARCIA, supra note 104, at 9.
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During the 2016 presidential campaign, President Trump wasted
few opportunities to denounce climate change policies and made clear
his opposition to the Paris Agreement.106 After his inauguration, it was
thus no surprise when he decided that the United States would exit,
despite press coverage of efforts by his daughter and secretary of state
urging him to remain in the Paris Agreement.107
After President Trump announced U.S. withdrawal in a widely
covered news conference, heightening the drama as in a reality
television show, the uncertainty lay in how exit would be executed.
There were several options available. Trump could have declared that
the Paris Agreement actually was a treaty and sent it to the Senate for
ratification, where it surely would have failed. He could have stated
that, by rescinding Obama’s executive agreement, he was immediately
withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement. Or he could
have stated his opposition to the Paris Agreement and simply ordered
the State Department to stop participating in meetings and ignore U.S.
commitments. He chose none of these. Instead, he triggered the exit
procedure laid out in Article 28.1 of the agreement, starting a two-year
process that will allow the United States formally to exit after
November 4, 2020.108 By choosing this last strategy, Trump implicitly
accepted that the U.S. entry to the Paris Agreement had been valid.
Using the exit framework set out in Part II, the Paris Agreement
presents a clear example of mapped exit. From the time President
Obama entered the Paris Agreement, the possible exit strategies for a
future president were clear. The Trump administration has followed
the procedure set out in the Paris Agreement at the time of its
adoption.
B. Uncertain Exit—The Keystone XL Pipeline
One of the most contentious policy decisions that the Obama
106. Donald Trump Would ‘Cancel’ Paris Climate Deal, BBC NEWS (May 27, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36401174 [https://perma.cc/UBS2-XNUH].
107. Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 31, 2017, 6:05 PM),
http://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/870083798981111808?lang=en [https://perma.cc/2LCT
-CECY].
108. Article 28.1 of the Agreement provides that, beginning three years after the Paris
Agreement’s entry into force, a party may withdraw by giving one year’s written notification to
the U.N. secretary-general. Paris Agreement, supra note 91, art. 28, para. 1. Because the Paris
Agreement came into force on November 4, 2016, the United States will only be able to give
notice for withdrawal starting on November 4, 2019. Under this time frame, the United States will
withdraw one year later, on November 4, 2020, the day after the 2020 presidential election is
scheduled.

RUHL AND SALZMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1752

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/26/2018 7:14 PM

[Vol. 67:1729

administration faced in its second term was whether to approve an
application that TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., filed with the
State Department to obtain authorization to construct, connect,
operate, and maintain oil pipeline facilities at the U.S.-Canadian
border in Phillips County, Montana. The project was known as the
Keystone XL pipeline and was intended to export Canadian crude oil
to the United States. Initially, all indications were that the Obama
administration was moving in the direction of granting the application;
the administration issued an environmental impact statement (EIS) in
2011 that declared the project environmentally on par with
alternatives.109 Although over a dozen major pipelines cross the border
with Canada, the Keystone XL pipeline took on a symbolic, if not toxic,
profile, and the Obama administration slowed down its process.110 The
State Department eventually issued a supplemental EIS (SEIS) in
January 2014, updating its environmental assessment and teeing up a
final permit decision but making no recommendation.111
Environmental interest group objections, centered around climate
change impacts, grew even louder in volume.112 Ultimately, after long
delay, President Obama announced his agreement with Secretary of
State John Kerry’s decision to deny the permit.113
During the 2016 presidential election, then-candidate Trump
vowed to reverse that decision. Within days of taking office, he issued
a presidential memorandum directing the State Department to revisit
the matter.114 The State Department announced issuance of the permit
with President Trump’s blessing on March 24, 2017,115 and immediately

109. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT FOR THE PROPOSED KEYSTONE XL PROJECT (Aug. 26, 2011).
110. See Juliet Eilperin, The Keystone XL Pipeline and Its Politics, Explained, WASH. POST
(Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/04/03/the-keystone-xlpipeline-and-its-politics-explained/?utm_term=.9ff4c8c98af5 [https://perma.cc/72DB-F5U8]; A
Chronological History of Controversial Keystone XL Pipeline Project, CBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/keystone-xl-pipeline-timeline-1.3950156 [https://perma.cc/88LKHMKP].
111. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE
KEYSTONE XL PROJECT (2014).
112. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
113. See Press Release, John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Keystone XL Pipeline Permit
Determination (Nov. 6, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/11/249249.htm
[https://perma.cc/FAT6-CRMT].
114. See Memorandum on Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline, supra note 13.
115. See Brady Dennis & Steven Mufson, As Trump Administration Grants Approval for
Keystone XL Pipeline, an Old Fight is Reignited, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/03/24/trump-admin
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became embroiled in litigation challenges.116
That the Keystone XL pipeline required State Department
approval at all is a story of presidential exercise of power through
direct action. Presidents have long taken the position that their
authority over foreign relations empowers them to permit or deny
border-crossing infrastructure.117 A complex web of executive orders
and agency rules and guidance governs the presidential permit process,
with two executive orders being of central importance to oil pipelines.
In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order 11423
to designate the State Department as the agency administering the
presidential permit program for specified cross-border facilities,
including oil pipelines.118 Executive Order 11423 references no specific
constitutional or statutory authority, asserting instead that “proper
conduct of the foreign relations of the United States requires that
executive permission be obtained for the construction and
maintenance at the borders of the United States of facilities connecting
the United States with a foreign country.”119 In 2004, President George
W. Bush amended Executive Order 11423 with Executive Order 13337,
which requires the State Department to issue a presidential permit “if
the Secretary of State finds that issuance of a permit to the applicant
would serve the national interest.”120
On their face, the two executive orders governing presidential
permits for oil pipelines look like a routine infrastructure approval
process, but the process is actually impacted greatly by the fact that the
permits are presidential rather than regulatory. Although the executive
orders do not mention specific statutes that include environmentalassessment requirements, such as the National Environmental Policy
istration-grants-approval-for-keystone-xl-pipeline/?utm_term=.5910fa2e282d [https://perma.cc/
6LLA-8YLD].
116. See Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 4:17-cv-00029-BMM (D.
Mont. Nov. 22, 2017); N. Plains Res. Council v. Shannon, No. 4:17-cv-00031-BMM (D. Mont. Nov.
22, 2017).
117. See LINDA LUTHER & PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44140,
PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT REVIEW FOR CROSS-BORDER PIPELINES AND ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION
1 (Apr. 19, 2017).
118. Exec. Order No. 11,423, 33 Fed. Reg. 11,741 (Aug 16, 1968).
119. Id.
120. Exec. Order No. 13,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299 (Apr. 30, 2004). Notably, a different set of
executive orders covers natural gas pipelines and electric-transmission lines, designating other
agencies as the permit administrators. Federal legislation also governs those facilities, but no
federal statute has been enacted governing oil pipeline siting, much less oil pipeline border
crossings. See generally ADAM VANN & PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43261,
PRESIDENTIAL PERMITS FOR BORDER CROSSING ENERGY FACILITIES (Oct. 29, 2013).
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Act (NEPA) or the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the State
Department conducts what it describes as a NEPA-“consistent” review
of applications for a presidential permit, which includes review
“consistent with” the ESA.121 By “consistent with,” however, the State
Department means not required by. The reality of presidential permits
for oil pipelines is that they are presidential permits. The president
issues them through the State Department, but Executive Order 13337
explicitly provides that the president retains the authority to make the
final decision on whether or not to issue the presidential permit.122
Environmental assessment laws such as NEPA and the ESA apply to
federal agencies, but do not apply to the president acting as the
president.123 The State Department has to make a finding regarding the
national interest and has taken upon itself the practice of conducting
environmental assessment, but the president makes the ultimate
decision—issuing a presidential permit is a classic direct action.124
For our purposes, Executive Orders 11423 and 13337 established
an uncertain exit regime. We defined uncertain exit as both ex ante and
opaque, meaning that “exit has been accounted for up front, but the
specific conditions for exit are difficult to determine in practice.”125 In
the regulatory exit context, the lack of clarity stems from the use of
subjective standards that make the exit dependent on a discretionary
judgment. Often the regulated party must meet a high burden of proof
because the requirements for exit are open ended and fact dependent.
121. Environmental Reviews for Presidential Permitting, U.S. DEP’T STATE,
https://www.state.gov/e/oes/eqt/reviews/index.htm [https://perma.cc/MMD4-8P34].
122. 69 Fed. Reg. at 25,300.
123. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.12 (2017) (noting that the president is not an agency for purposes of
NEPA); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992) (noting that absent specific
mention of the president, statutory silence cannot be construed to extend jurisdiction over the
president).
124. There is sparse case law on the legal implications of this unusual structure for presidential
direct action. One court has held that nothing about the State Department’s role in the
presidential permit process changes the presidential character of the action, thus insulating the
State Department’s actions from the requirements of NEPA and the ESA. See SissetonWahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1081–82 (D.S.D. 2009). By contrast,
another court held that, while the president’s exercise of permitting power is constitutional, the
executive order delegating the permitting evaluation function to the State Department subjects
the agency to judicial review of its NEPA compliance. See Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d
1147, 1157 (D. Minn. 2010). Under that reasoning, it is not clear what would happen if a court
deems the State Department’s EIS deficient under NEPA but the president nonetheless issues a
border-crossing permit under the retained “final decision” authority. Also, presumably the
president could nullify the effect of the court’s decision by withdrawing delegation of the State
Department’s permitting functions for any particular permit.
125. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 29, at 1319.
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This is equally true for the presidential permit regime for oil pipelines.
Executive Order 11423 established a default rule that no oil
pipeline may cross into the United States without a presidential permit.
Executive Order 13337 imposes a high burden on pipeline applicants
to convince the State Department that the border crossing would serve
the national interest, and the State Department has imposed rigorous
environmental and other assessment steps in connection with satisfying
that burden. There is no objective standard for what is in the national
interest, and the State Department—and even more certainly the
president—retains substantial discretion to make that judgment. When
President Trump acted to reverse President Obama’s permit denial,
therefore, the process for doing so was clearly defined ex ante—the
State Department would review the application pursuant to the
executive-order regime—but the “national interest” standard was
opaque. Indeed, this time the permit was deemed to have met the
“national interest” standard based on no new environmental or other
impact analysis from the State Department.
C. Adaptive Exit—Shrinking National Monuments
Following through on a promise made early in his term, on April
26, 2017, President Trump ignited a firestorm of controversy by issuing
an executive order directing Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke to
recommend whether President Trump should reduce or abolish
terrestrial and marine national monuments that had been established
or expanded by proclamation of his predecessors, beginning with those
from President Clinton’s first term.126 Trump’s unprecedented order
specified the policies, substantive criteria, and procedural steps
Secretary Zinke was to use in making his recommendations, and
required a final report within 120 days of the order. Following a public
comment period that yielded over 2 million comments, Secretary
Zinke provided a final report on August 24, 2017, recommending that
President Trump amend the proclamations establishing or expanding
ten national monuments, so as to significantly modify the boundaries
and management conditions they imposed.127 On December 8, 2017,
126. Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017).
127. RYAN ZINKE, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, OFFICIAL REPORT SUMMARY REGARDING
NATIONAL MONUMENTS [hereinafter OFFICIAL REPORT SUMMARY REGARDING NATIONAL
MONUMENTS], https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/monument-report-summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4L24-2TW8]; see also RYAN ZINKE, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FINAL REPORT
SUMMARIZING FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW OF DESIGNATIONS UNDER THE ANTIQUITIES ACT,
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4052225/Interior-Secretary-Ryan-Zinke-s-Report-
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President Trump did so for two large national monuments, providing
extensive justifications tracking the executive order’s criteria for
drastically reducing their sizes and altering their management
regimes.128
So far, this sounds like a plan to implement simple mapped exit.
But there is a hitch—it is not clear that President Trump has any legal
authority to alter so much as a comma in his predecessors’
proclamations. A flurry of lawsuits filed the day of the two
proclamations put that legal question front and center.129
Each of the national monuments targeted in Secretary Zinke’s
report was established by presidential proclamation issued under the
authority of the Antiquities Act of 1906 (Antiquities Act).130 Although
a short and seemingly obscure statute, the Antiquities Act has played
a surprisingly large role in federal public-lands conservation dating
back to President Teddy Roosevelt, who signed the Antiquities Act
and was the first to use its authority, designating the Devil’s Tower
National Monument four months later.131 The statute’s operative
language establishes a remarkable authority in the president to
“declare by public proclamation” areas of “land owned or controlled
by the Federal Government to be national monuments.”132 These areas
must be “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and
other objects of historic or scientific interest”133 and must “be confined
to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management
of the objects to be protected.”134 Beyond that, the statute imposes no
substantive or procedural constraints—a president may proclaim a
to-the.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GLC-JAST] (detailing the full findings of the investigation).
128. Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,089 (Dec. 8, 2017); Proclamation No. 9682, 82
Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 8, 2017).
129. See Courtney Tanner, Here’s a Breakdown of the 5 Lawsuits Filed Against Trump that
Challenge His Cuts to 2 Utah National Monuments, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Dec. 11, 2017),
http://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2017/12/11/heres-a-breakdown-of-the-5-lawsuits-filedagainst-trump-challenging-his-cuts-to-two-utah-national-monuments/ [https://perma.cc/W3PQYSTZ].
130. OFFICIAL REPORT SUMMARY REGARDING NATIONAL MONUMENTS, supra note 127, at
1; see also 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301–320303 (2012).
131. See Devils Tower – Early Conservationists, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/
deto/learn/historyculture/first-fifty-years-monument-established.htm
[https://perma.cc/W82EWR2R]; THEODORE ROOSEVELT, DEVILS TOWER NATIONAL MONUMENT PROCLAMATION
(1906)
http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record/?libID=
o293443 [https://perma.cc/D8YM-MHY7].
132. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 320301(b).

RUHL AND SALZMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

PRESIDENTIAL EXIT

4/26/2018 7:14 PM

1757

national monument purely by direct action, without involvement of
Congress, federal agencies, state or local officials, or the public, and
subject to narrowly limited judicial review.135
The broad authority packed into the Antiquities Act has made it
an environmental policy darling of recent presidents—at least until
President Trump—who have designated billions of acres of terrestrial
and marine federal public lands and waters as national monuments
since President Clinton’s first term.136 These designations have long
been controversial, for reasons President Trump spelled out in his
executive order, including that they “have a substantial impact on the
management of Federal lands and the use and enjoyment of
neighboring lands” and “result from a lack of public outreach and
proper coordination with State, tribal, and local officials and other
relevant stakeholders.”137 The controversy of interest for this Article,
though, concerns whether presidential exit from a prior national
monument proclamation is even possible.138
As soon as President Trump announced his intention to reopen
his predecessors’ national monument proclamations, a robust debate
ensued over whether the Antiquities Act permits a president to alter
existing monuments.139 Although a few presidents have tinkered with
the size and management of national monuments established by
predecessors, none of these changes has been significant and no

135. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
136. NAT’L PARK SERV., ANTIQUITIES ACT MONUMENTS LIST, https://www.nps.gov/history/
archeology/sites/antiquities/MonumentsList.htm [https://perma.cc/WL48-EQKE].
137. Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017).
138. A similar issue has arisen with respect to President Trump’s rescission by executive order
of several of President Obama’s presidential memorandums withdrawing offshore submerged
lands from oil and gas development pursuant to statutorily delegated direct-action authority. See
Kevin O. Leske, “Un-Shelfing” Lands Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA):
Can a Prior Executive Withdrawal Under Section 12(a) be Trumped by a Subsequent President?,
26 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2017) (arguing there is no rescission authority over areas once they are
withdrawn).
139. Compare Richard H. Seamon, Dismantling Monuments, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 51), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3054682 [https://perma.cc/F83E-4GNH]
(concluding that President Trump has the authority to “undo the acts of his predecessors” by
“reduc[ing] or rescind[ing] monuments they created”), with Mark Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas
S. Bryner & Sean B. Hecht, Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National
Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 56 (2017) (“[T]he President lacks the legal authority to
abolish or diminish national monuments.”), and Hope M. Babcock, Rescission of a Previously
Designated National Monument: A Bad Idea Whose Time has not Come, 37 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3
(2017) (arguing the president lacks the authority). See also Antiquities Act: Legal Implications for
Executive and Congressional Action, 48 ENVTL. L. REP. 10187 (2018) (reprinting an interview
with several experts presenting differing views).

RUHL AND SALZMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1758

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/26/2018 7:14 PM

[Vol. 67:1729

president has attempted to completely abolish a national monument.140
The statute is silent on whether a president can shrink or abolish an
existing monument, and no court has decided the question.141 Thus the
debate that President Trump triggered has focused on interpretations
of the statute’s legislative history, provisions of related legislation, and
the scope of presidential power generally. Indeed, President Trump’s
executive order did not expressly reference the Antiquities Act as its
authority, declaring instead that is it based on “the authority vested in
me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States
of America.”142
We do not weigh in here regarding the controversy over the
correct interpretation of the Antiquities Act. Rather, the fact that there
is a controversy—that it is not clear whether President Trump can do
what he purports to want to do—raises his executive order as an
example of adaptive presidential exit. We defined adaptive exit as
occurring “when clear standards are established for exit but not until
after the program has commenced,” and surmised that it “may also be
the case that the demand for exit is only recognized after creation of
the program, when experience makes clear that the original mechanism
or conditions for exit were inadequate, making exit either too easy or
too difficult.”143 We also explained that engaging in adaptive exit can
lead to the creation of a mapped exit or uncertain exit regime going
forward.144
By all appearances, President Trump’s executive order was the
first step in this direction, establishing the criteria and process for exit,
and his proclamations followed that process to accomplish exit. The
intensity of the debate over what is “clearly” the standard for exit
under the Antiquities Act highlights that there were, in fact, no clear
standards for exit when the statute was enacted. Over a century later,
for all practical purposes, President Trump has invented an adaptive
exit response. Tracking the language of the statute, his executive order
transparently enlisted the secretary of the interior to evaluate whether
the monuments in question are “historic landmarks, historic and
140. See ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ANTIQUITIES ACT: SCOPE OF
AUTHORITY FOR MODIFICATION OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS, R44687 (Nov. 14, 2016),
http://www.law.indiana.edu/publicland/files/national_monuments_modifications_CRS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97DU-DPVF].
141. See id.
142. Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. at 20,429.
143. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 29, at 1321.
144. Id. at 1331.
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prehistoric structures, [or] other objects of historic or scientific
interest,” whether they are confined to “the smallest area compatible
with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected,”
and what the impacts of the monuments are on state, local, and other
interests.145
Eventually the courts will sort out whether a president can amend
a prior Antiquities Act proclamation at all, and if so, under what
circumstances, conditions, and limits. At that point, if exit is legally
permissible, a mapped exit or uncertain exit regime will have been
established moving forward. Whether it adopts President Trump’s
approach or not remains to be seen.
D. Messed-Up Exit—Transgender Ban in the Military
On July 26, 2017, President Trump tweeted that “[a]fter
consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised
that the United States Government will not accept or allow”146
“[t]ransgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S.
Military.”147 This tweet purported to reverse an Obama administration
policy that allowed openly transgender troops to serve.148 It is hard to
imagine a clearer statement of exit. What resulted, though, was an
opaque standard where exit still remains unclear.
Despite President Trump’s claim of consultation, this policy
reversal had not been reviewed with the Pentagon. Indeed, the U.S.
Department of Defense had actually been in the process of assessing
rules and regulations for the integration of transgender service
members.149 A barrage of questions from the press inquired into how
145. Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. at 20,429 (alteration in original).
146. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM)
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864
[https://perma.cc/6RY7-HV
6P].
147. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472 [https://perma.cc/6LML-QB
8X].
148. Announcement of the policy came through the Department of Defense. See Jonah Engel
Bromwich, How U.S. Military Policy on Transgender Personnel Changed Under Obama, N.Y.
TIMES (July 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/us/politics/trans-military-trumptimeline.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Q8PK-XREA]; Jeremy Diamond, Trump to Reinstate US
Military Ban on Transgender People, CNN POL. (July 26, 2017) http://www.cnn.com/
2017/07/26/politics/trump-military-transgender/index.html [https://perma.cc/7HAG-7QVV].
149. Amanda Terkel, Transgender Military Members at Risk of Harassment Under Trump,
Says Former Army Secretary, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2017) https://www.huffington
post.com/entry/eric-fanning-trump_us_59a47882e4b0446b3b85ba2b
[https://perma.cc/HQJ8372T].
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the policy would be applied to transgender service members already
serving, whether enlisted transgender service members would be
discharged or allowed to remain, and how the policy would apply for
future enlistments, among other concerns.150 The military leaders could
offer no details.151 They had become the victim, in some respects, of a
sneak attack.
President Trump announced this policy reversal on the sixty-ninth
anniversary of President Harry Truman’s historic executive order
requiring desegregation of troops in 1948.152 Unlike the Truman policy
change, however, the Trump tweet raised more questions than it
answered. The day after the announced exit from Obama’s policy, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph F. Dunford,
wrote that there would be no exit. General Dunford stated that, “there
will be no modifications to the current policy until the President’s
direction has been received by the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary has issued implementation guidance.”153 Despite the
absolute tone of the tweet that had started this controversy, the
military’s position was confirmed by the White House spokeswoman,
who explained that “implementation policy is going to be something
that the White House and the Department of Defense have to work
together to lawfully determine.”154
A month after his initial tweet, President Trump signed a
presidential memorandum setting out the policy change.155 But this did
not clearly establish exit, either. Claiming that the Obama
150. Id.
151. See Jeannie Suk Gersen, Trump’s Tweeted Transgender Ban Is Not a Law, NEW YORKER
(July 27, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trumps-tweeted-transgender-banis-not-a-law [https://perma.cc/64GU-2XTV] (“The Times said it asked eight Defense Department
officials how the ban would be carried out and how it would affect openly transgender active-duty
members. None of the officials could give a definitive answer.”).
152. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948) (“It is hereby declared to be the
policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in
the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.”).
153. W.J. Hennigan, Top U.S. General Says Pentagon Will Not Change Policy on Transgender
Troops Until White House Acts, L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/
washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-top-u-s-general-tells-military-leaders1501171360-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/E59J-7AN8].
154. Erik Wemple, White House Press Secretary Almost Bails on Briefing over Her Failure to
Discuss White House Policy, WASH. POST (July 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2017/07/26/white-house-press-secretary-almost-bails-on-briefing-overher-failure-to-discuss-white-house-policy/?utm_term=.7e5f9df3f438
[https://perma.cc/C3RGZR9Z].
155. Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 587 (Aug. 25, 2017).
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administration had failed to identify a sufficient basis to conclude that
terminating the transgender ban would not hinder military
effectiveness, the order said that further study was needed.156 As a
result, the order directed the secretary of defense and the secretary of
homeland security to revert to the pre-Obama policy, barring
enlistment of openly transgender people and not spending money for
sex-reassignment surgical procedures. In practice, though, the order
did not follow through on the tweet’s claim of exit. The ban would only
remain in place “until such time as a sufficient basis exists upon which
to conclude that terminating that policy and practice would not have
the negative effects discussed above.”157 Secretary of Defense James
Mattis responded by stating that the Obama policy would remain in
place until he had received input from an expert panel on how best to
implement Trump’s announced policy.158As a result, as of publication
there is still no meaningful guidance for transgender troops currently
serving, who remain on active duty while the internal expert group
assesses the issues. Months after Trump’s announced exit, no one knew
how exit is happening, by what means or by what standard. By starting
with the tweeted exit communication, President Trump has made a
mess of easy go.
IV. UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL EXIT
We now come full circle back to the question Sharece Thrower
posed at the conclusion of her study of executive-order longevity: If
presidents know that their direct actions can be subsequently amended
or revoked, does that influence their decisions about the types of
actions they issue—particularly if they care about their legacies? Of
course, presidents know that successors can, and likely will, revoke,
amend, and supersede some of their direct actions. And so does
Congress. But what if they don’t want their actions to be amended or
revoked, at least not without a fight? How can Congress or the
president make direct actions “sticky?” And what is to be made of
President Trump’s apparent practice of gumming up his own exit
events?

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Bill Chappell, Mattis Puts Hold on Transgender Ban for Current Military Service
Members, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/08/30/547258742/mattis-puts-hold-on-transgender-ban-for-current-military-servicemembers [https://perma.cc/J6NC-UVNJ].

RUHL AND SALZMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1762

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/26/2018 7:14 PM

[Vol. 67:1729

A. Constraining Presidential Exit
A central theme in our earlier Regulatory Exit article was our
analysis of the ways Congress and agencies can constrain legislative
and administrative exit through design strategies implemented at the
inception of a regulatory regime. Similarly, Congress and the president
can design strategically to constrain the practice of future presidential
exit.
1. Congressional Design Strategies. Although the flow of direct
actions from the White House is often denounced as prime evidence of
the increasing concentration of presidential power, the irony is that
many direct actions exercise authority that Congress has delegated to
the president.159 The Antiquities Act case study provides a shining
example. Given the Antiquities Act’s condition that national
monuments be the “smallest area” needed, the Antiquities Act
“power-grab” debate had, until recently, focused on whether
presidents have the authority to declare national monuments of vast
proportions.160 But the debate now has turned to exit authority—
whether President Trump has the authority to substantially reduce or
revoke prior Antiquities Act proclamations. That question is
complicated by the statute’s complete silence on the issue.161 But what
if, instead, Congress expressly had dictated the terms of presidential
exit in the statute itself?
For example, Congress might have provided that, once designated
by presidential proclamation, any modification of the boundaries or
management conditions of a national monument would require an act
of Congress. Alternately, the Antiquities Act might have required that

159. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 42, at 40–54 (differentiating between executive orders based
on constitutional authority, statutory authority, and asserted inherent executive powers); Stack,
The Statutory President, supra note 42, at 546–57 (differentiating between executive orders and
other presidential orders); Thrower, supra note 27, at 646 (differentiating between executive
orders “based on explicit authority from statutes” and those based on “vague claims of authority
from the Constitution”).
160. Seamon, supra note 139 (manuscript at 16–21) (discussing the recent practice of
presidents declaring “landscape monuments” and questioning its legality).
161. Administrative law scholar Richard Seamon argues that the power to modify or abolish
national monuments should be implied based on practice, on facilitation of the president’s duty
to carry out the laws, and on the default principle of free reign to change predecessor direct
actions. Id. (manuscript at 33–40). Environmental law scholar Mark Squillace and his co-authors
do not address the implied powers aspect, arguing that the statute and related federal laws reserve
all power to alter declared monuments to Congress. Squillace et al., supra note 139, at 56–71. We
do not address the issue of implied authority here.
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any such modification, if proposed by the president, be subject to the
consent of the states within which the national monument is situated
or, following the model for agency regulations, that the secretary of the
interior provide a justification for why proposed modifications are not
arbitrary and capricious or fail to meet some other standard. A similar
approach might require what President Trump has come close to
attempting—that is, that subsequent modifications must be based on
the same presidential findings regarding values and size that Congress
has imposed on national monument creation in the first place.162
Congress surely could impose these and similar conditions on the
president’s power to create national monuments without treading on
constitutionally mandated separation of powers—the president has no
inherent constitutional authority to declare national monuments on
federal land. Such exit conditions are commonplace and present no
constitutional concerns when imposed on an agency that is, for
example, reducing an emissions limit established in an agency rule or
changing the use restrictions of a national forest—that was a central
point we made in Regulatory Exit. So why not impose these exit
conditions on the president? If Congress can delegate relatively
unfettered power to presidents to proclaim national monuments, it
follows that it can constrain or enable the presidential power to exit
from them once proclaimed.163
To be sure, we are not arguing that Congress has a free hand in
how it designs presidential exit. It would be a far different question, for
example, were Congress to attempt to constrain presidential exit in
realms where the president’s direct actions are purported to be based
solely on the president’s inherent constitutional powers, for which no
congressional consent or involvement is needed at the inception. For
example, consider an omnibus statute under which Congress purports
to govern direct actions by dictating that, once issued, successor
presidents have no authority to amend, supersede, or revoke them. As
applied to President Obama’s executive agreement entering the Paris

162. Squillace et al. argue that “allowing a President to second-guess the judgment of a
predecessor as to the amount of land needed to protect the objects identified in a proclamation is
fraught with peril because it essentially denies the first President the power that Congress granted
to proclaim monuments.” Squillace et al., supra note 139, at 68. But the essence of presidential
exit’s easy come, easy go default rule is exactly that it allows a president to second guess a
predecessor’s judgment.
163. For further elaboration on this point, including whether there are limits on congressional
action in this regard, see Mark Seidenfeld, A Process-Based Approach to Presidential Exit, 67
DUKE L.J. 1775 (2018)
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Accord, such a limitation would have prevented President Trump from
exiting. But Congress had no power to prevent President Obama from
entering the Paris Accord—that was the point of entering through an
executive agreement rather than a treaty—and, similarly, Congress has
no power to prevent President Trump from exiting the accord.164 To be
sure, Congress could attempt through legislation to nullify either
President Obama’s entry or President Trump’s exit as a practical
matter, perhaps by constraining or mandating federal agency measures
consistent with the accord, but that would require presidential
cooperation and falls well short of directly controlling a president’s
execution or revocation of direct actions.
Congress thus appears to have far more leeway to constrain
presidential exit from statutorily delegated direct actions than from
those based on the president’s constitutional authority. But assuming
that to be the case, why would it do so? The Antiquities Act again
provides a fitting example of reasons why. On the one hand, if the
congressional purpose is to promote national monuments, then
constraining exit makes sense—it ensures national monuments, once
proclaimed, either remain intact permanently or, if exit is not entirely
precluded, can only be modified using the mapped or uncertain exit
process Congress had imposed ex ante. On the other hand, perhaps
emboldened by the sense of exit immunity, recent presidents have
proclaimed such large monuments that many commentators have
questioned whether they truly meet the statute’s criteria for values and
size.165 It may be politically difficult for Congress to override such
outliers through negating legislation. To guard against that kind of
runaway train, therefore, providing a mapped exit power could signal
to incumbent presidents that the criteria should be followed closely, so
that successors do not reshape monuments with the stroke of a pen.
Leaving the matter unaddressed has led both to President Trump’s
attempt to implement adaptive exit and to the battle between opposing
interpretations of the statute, which will certainly bedevil the
impending litigation challenging his move.
The analytical framework we developed in Regulatory Exit for
making such choices thus maps well onto choices Congress has
164. STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44761, WITHDRAWAL FROM
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, THE PARIS AGREEMENT, AND THE
IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 6, 17 (2017) (noting that “[i]n the case of executive agreements,
the President’s authority to terminate such agreements unilaterally ‘has not been seriously
questioned in the past’” and concluding the Paris Agreement is such an action (citation omitted)).
165. Seamon, supra note 139 (manuscript at 16–21).
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regarding presidential exit for statutes delegating direct-action
authority. In the case of presidential exit, however, this choice is made
against a background, default mapped exit rule that presidents have a
free hand to amend, supersede, or revoke prior direct actions. Hence,
Congress must first make a threshold determination whether to depart
from that rule. Congress might do so for a variety of reasons. As noted
above for the Antiquities Act, it may wish to promote the goals of the
statutory program by making it work in one direction—for example,
always adding to the stock of monuments. Or Congress might
anticipate that private and public reliance on prior presidential direct
actions may lead to entrenched interests which should be upset, if at
all, only through congressional initiative.
If for these and similar reasons Congress decides easy go is not the
appropriate exit model, it has three choices: mapped exit, uncertain
exit, and adaptive exit. Which of those three options Congress chooses
depends on Congress’s motivation in implementing an exit strategy. If
Congress wishes to control the conditions of exit tightly, which may
promote passage of the delegating statute if there is concern over
unbridled presidential discretion, an ex ante mapped exit model is
appropriate. Agreement over the need for exit may prevail, but not
over the precise terms, in which case ex ante uncertain exit balances
the desire for exit conditions with the flexibility of presidential
discretion to interpret the ambiguous terms. If exit is simply not a
concern, or dealing with it ex ante could be too politically controversial,
Congress could punt the issue by remaining silent, as it did in the
Antiquities Act, leaving it to later legislative or presidential adaptive
exit.
2. Presidential Design Strategies. Although Congress can exert
significant control over presidential exit for statutorily delegated direct
actions, whether a president can alter the default rule for successor
presidents is a far different matter. The easy come, easy go nature of
direct actions would seem to bind the hands of presidents in binding
the hands of future presidents. As an institutional matter, agencies and
Congress surely seem to have less freedom to reverse predecessor
decisions.
For example, while it is true that no Congress can absolutely bind
a future Congress, undoing a prior Congress’s legislation with new
legislation is difficult because of the enactment process, the slow
turnover rate of members, and the need for presidential concurrence.
Similarly, agencies must navigate procedural obstacles to reverse
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previously adopted rules, and cannot deviate outside the bounds of
statutory and judicial parameters. Leaving aside the politics, when
Congress or an agency builds exit ex ante into a program, there are
substantial legal and practical obstacles constraining a later Congress
or agency hoping to undo or alter the exit strategy. Presidents, by
contrast, often have a far easier time undoing a predecessor’s direct
actions—it is usually just a matter of issuing another direct action,
which often has no process constraints. Yet, as our case studies show,
this is not always true in practice.
As a starting point, Thrower’s empirical findings on executive
order longevity suggest that presidents can often boost the life span of
a direct action through decisions about timing (issue actions during a
divided government to increase longevity), subject matter (actions
relating to foreign relations tend to stick around longer), and authority
references (clear statutory authority is best).166 These exit constraints
make it more politically costly for successors to attempt to unwind the
action. But can a president go further and expressly build legal or
structural constraints into presidential exit, as Congress can do for
statutorily based direct actions?
Obviously, a president cannot prevent successors from amending,
superseding, or revoking a direct action simply by inserting a
prohibition on exit into the text of the direct action itself. But as our
case studies of the Paris Agreement and the Keystone XL pipeline
suggest, presidents can use what Professor Sarah Light (in this issue)
calls exit “horcruxes” to impede successor exit.167 That is, a president
can tie a direct action to external instruments or institutions that
substantially alter the optics, if not the structural and legal viability, of
successor exit.
President Obama’s executive agreement committing the United
States to the Paris Agreement is an example of a horcrux strategy tying
the direct action to another, more legally stable action—the
international agreement—which specified an express mapped exit
withdrawal process. Could President Trump have simply rescinded
President Obama’s executive agreement as a way of exiting the Paris
Agreement? Almost certainly. But he did not. That would have been
the ultimate thumbing of one’s nose at the international community,
with potential reputational costs in foreign relations felt well beyond
the confines of the Paris Agreement and well beyond President
166. Thrower, supra note 27, at 650–55.
167. Sarah E. Light, Regulatory Horcruxes, 67 DUKE L.J. 1647 (2018).
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Trump’s tenure in office.
Similarly, the presidential permit process for the Keystone XL
pipeline operates under two executive orders, making future exit more
difficult by inserting a horcrux into the process in the form the State
Department and its presidentially delegated task of permit evaluation
and issuance.168 President Trump’s reversal of President Obama’s
permit denial could have taken the form of a bare executive order
revoking the two governing executive orders and issuing the permit
straight from the Oval Office. But it did not—his order specifically
incorporated the two executive orders and directed the State
Department to follow them. Even if Trump was only paying lip service
to the process, channeling his decision through the State Department
was tacit acknowledgement of the exit regime his predecessors had
erected. Acting outside that process would have produced more fodder
for the power-grab critique.
Hence, while presidents cannot impose exit regimes with binding
legal effect on successors, the horcrux strategy can slow down
presidential exit by implanting procedural obstacles outside the White
House. Yet the obstacles can extend even further than the examples
given above—horcruxes could, for example, set into motion agency
actions to restructure agency organization, policy and, even more
potently, promulgation of agency legislative rules. In Professor Light’s
model, these tactics involve horizontal horcruxes that split exit
authority and process between institutions in such a way as to impede
the completion of presidential exit. Consider, for example, President
Clinton’s 1993 executive order on environmental justice,169 which
cemented and extended efforts the EPA had already initiated to
promote more socially equitable environmental regulation and
enforcement. Twenty-five years later, the EPA’s environmental justice
program, administered through its Office of Environmental Justice, is
vast, and includes extensive guidance documents on regulation and
permitting, grants to promote environmental justice, and interagency
coordination.170 Unwinding this extensive agency structure would

168. The strength of the horcrux effect produced by delegation of this task to the State
Department depends on how one views the resulting relationship between the president and the
agency. The more “unitary” one envisions the president, the less “external” the horcrux. As noted
above, courts have disagreed over this feature of the presidential permit program. See supra note
124.
169. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
170. Environmental Justice, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice [https://perma.
cc/9BG5-E8EA].
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involve extensive effort. To be sure, President Trump or a successor
could do so through a direct action revoking President Clinton’s order
and dismantling the EPA’s initiatives, as none of them have been
codified through legislation or agency rulemaking, but it will take a
concerted, planned effort and many strokes of the pen to unwind the
EPA’s environmental-justice-implementation organization and
process.
Another effective strategy a president can take is to include
commands to initiate agency rulemaking in the direct action. If the
agency follows through, a successor can easily revoke the direct action
itself, but undoing the agency regulation involves either promulgation
of another agency regulation or enactment of legislation defunding or
prohibiting the action. For example, in 2013 President Obama issued a
presidential memorandum on power sector carbon standards, directing
the EPA to promulgate rules governing carbon emissions from existing
and new power plants.171 President Trump revoked that memorandum
by executive order in March 2017,172 but Trump’s revocation occurred
long after the EPA responded to the Obama action by promulgating
the Clean Power Plan in 2015.173 Obviously, President Trump could not
revoke the Clean Power Plan through presidential direct action.
Instead, he has directed the EPA to review the rule under the criteria
spelled out in his executive order and mandated that the EPA “if
appropriate, shall, as soon as practicable . . . publish for notice and
comment proposed rules suspending, revising, or rescinding those
rules”—that is, Trump has ordered the EPA to engage in
administrative exit.174 President Obama’s memorandum is history, and
at the end of the day the Clean Power Plan may be as well, but the
horizontally split horcrux will have had its effect in delaying the
presidential exit, allowing politics to challenge the presidential exit and
enabling litigation to challenge the administrative exit.
Hence, Professor Light’s horcrux concept is a useful way of
thinking about how presidents can constrain successor exit. Essentially,
the horcruxes leverage other executive branch entities to slow down
the successor exit process. In some cases, a successor could ignore the

171. Memorandum on Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 457 (June 25, 2013).
172. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
173. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60).
174. 82 Fed. Reg. at 16,095.
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horcrux, as President Trump could have done with the Keystone XL
permit, but its presence makes that approach more politically costly.
And in the agency rulemaking strategy, though the presidential direct
action can be nullified, the horcrux lives on in the agency and cannot
be ignored—the agency must follow applicable administrative exit
procedures. Presidents thus are not without means of constraining
successor exit.
B. Presidential Self-Constraint Through Symbolic Exit
While President Trump has thus far engaged in significantly fewer
exits from predecessor direct actions than have past presidents,175 his
use of exit feels quite different. For starters, it seems ubiquitous.
Indeed, most of his high-profile actions have involved exit of one kind
or another—not just the direct-action examples in our case studies but
also administrative exit efforts to end the Affordable Care Act,
withdraw from the Trans Pacific Partnership, pull out of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, and end the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program, to name just a few. Indeed, in a sense his
presidency has been predicated on exit through his concerted efforts to
dismantle the Obama administration’s legacy.176
In many of these efforts, President Trump has engaged in a novel
strategy we call symbolic exit. President Trump’s symbolic exits are not
symbolic actions, like declaring National Blood Donors Month.177
Instead, President Trump follows a consistent strategy where he
publicly announces exit, often through tweets, which are followed by
intense media coverage. In fact, though, these exits are usually
incomplete. Indeed, the irony of this approach is that President Trump
has self-imposed constraints on what otherwise could have been plain
vanilla easy come, easy go mapped exit.
Our case studies make clear that Trump has consistently chosen
symbolic exit over actual exit. In pulling out of the Paris Agreement,
for example, President Trump chose to use the exit provisions of the
Paris Agreement—which requires a two-year period before
withdrawal comes into force—instead of sending the treaty to the
Senate or unilaterally and immediately withdrawing. In doing so, he

175. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
176. Alex Pappas, Trump Is Dismantling Obama’s Executive Action Legacy, FOX NEWS
(Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/09/08/trump-is-dismantling-obama-sexecutive-action-legacy.html [https://perma.cc/9CLF-5UA5].
177. Proclamation 3952, 35 Fed. Reg. 41 (Dec. 31, 1969).
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retained the option to stay in the Agreement until 2019. For the
Antiquities Act, the president indicated his intent to exit from some of
the current national monument designations, but asked the secretary
of the interior to recommend specific changes. The same is true for the
transgender military ban: President Trump tweeted the ban but later
conditioned it on military advice, and even allowed for the possibility
that he would lift the ban entirely if he were so persuaded.
There is a clear pattern. Often using social media (as in the
transgender military ban) or a high-profile press conference (as in the
Paris Agreement), Trump makes a big show of exit to his base. If you
look at the substance, though, the nature of exit is less clear. These
“exits” are almost all subject to further review or a time lag. This
inevitable bow to political realities does not alter the clear message of
exit, even if the eventual exit is much less significant than first declared.
The Trump administration is therefore noteworthy in introducing
a new dimension of ambiguity to presidential exit. He is the first
president to systematically promote symbolic exit. In past
administrations, the contours of presidential exit have been clear. Exit
means exit: “I revoke that direct action”; “I supersede that action with
this one”; “I amend Section X of that action.” No more action is
needed. Trump, by contrast, proclaims to the Twitterverse, “I’m
exiting!” Upon closer inspection, though, the message is, “I’ll let you
know later what we’re doing.”
This strategy is political, not legal. Each of these exits sends a clear
message to his base. In exiting the Paris Agreement, Trump has
signaled that he is rejecting climate change commitments. In exiting the
Antiquities Act, Trump is signaling his support of states’ rights to
control federal public lands. In exiting the transgenders-in-the-military
policy, Trump has signaled his opposition to LGBT rights. The expert
panel may ultimately decide to bar transgender service members or it
may not. But by the time it announces its decision, the public’s eye will
have turned to another issue.
While symbolic exit looks like planned self-constraint and may
prove an effective political strategy—scoring political points while
retaining flexibility—it comes with high costs to other institutions and
the public. By declaring exit but creating ambiguity in what this
actually means, symbolic exit creates uncertainty. Did the tweets—
which we now know are official presidential statements—mean exit or
not? Furthermore, symbolic exit has real consequences: an unclear
path toward exit spawns litigation, placing courts in the position of
determining the contours of presidential exit in practice.
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To put this in perspective, imagine if an agency or Congress acted
like this, declaring an intent to reverse course, throwing the gears of
process into motion, but then vacillating and protracting the process
indefinitely. The uncertainty this would impose on economic and social
interests would be damaging. Indeed, one might reasonably conclude
that President Trump’s symbolic exit strategy has thrown Congress and
agencies like the EPA into exactly that mode. This new form of
presidential exit thus illustrates both the power of presidential direct
actions and of exit from them.
CONCLUSION
On the campaign trail, President Trump promised to undo
President Obama’s agenda on many fronts. Upon taking office, he
quickly began to do just that, rescinding a series of Obama’s executive
orders, presidential memoranda, and other direct actions. This made
news headlines, although in some respects it should not have—it is
common for presidents from opposing parties to undo many of their
predecessors’ direct actions.
Despite the near-ubiquity of this activity, it has largely escaped
scholarly notice. Indeed, in Regulatory Exit, we completely overlooked
the role of presidential exit.
Our starting point in this Article thus was to ask how well the
model of exit developed in Regulatory Exit maps onto the president.
With two important modifications, it maps well. The first modification
has to do with the purpose of the specific exit. For legislatures and
agencies, exit is intended to pull back from established regulatory
burdens and benefits. For presidential direct actions, exit is intended
to alter the course set by a predecessor president, which can involve
regulatory burdens or benefits as well as the broader array of
presidential constitutional authorities and statutory authorities. The
second modification stems from the fact that presidential exit comes
with a built-in default rule of mapped exit, in that a direct action can
swiftly be undone with another direct action. This default of mapped
exit also means there is no such thing as messy exit for direct actions.
Our case studies showed not only how the categories of mapped
exit, uncertain exit, and adaptive exit map well onto presidential exit,
but also how the default rule for direct actions—easy come, easy go—
is not always followed. In the Paris Agreement example of mapped
exit, President Obama threw a horcrux into the exit dynamics by
linking his executive agreement to the terms of exit specified in the
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Paris Accord. Though President Trump could have simply revoked
Obama’s executive agreement, he has instead followed the exit terms
of the Paris Accord. In the Keystone XL pipeline example of uncertain
exit, President Trump followed prior executive orders that delegated a
role to the State Department before reversing President Obama’s
denial of the permit. In the Antiquities Act example of adaptive exit,
rather than simply issue proclamations shrinking the two national
monuments, President Trump closely tracked the statutory language as
the exit criteria, delegating a role to the U.S. Department of the
Interior. And lastly, we created the category of messed-up exit in place
of messy exit to capture President Trump’s practice of undermining the
easy come, easy go default rule by obfuscating the terms of his exit from
prior direct actions. Indeed, his behavior in this regard so pervades his
broader exit agenda, reaching not only direct actions but also agency
and legislative agendas, that we created a metacategory of exit,
symbolic exit, to encompass its political and legal implications.
Presidential exit is thus a more varied and complex story than the
easy come, easy go default rule would suggest. Regardless of what one
thinks about his policy positions, President Trump’s exits from direct
actions, while more sparing in number than his predecessors, reveal the
importance of thinking about presidential exit as a discrete form of exit
that warrants attention from Congress and presidents as they
contemplate the use of direct action authority.
Simply put, when Congress delegates direct-action authority to
the president by statute, it should consider whether and how
presidential exit can occur. While the president does not have the
power to bind successors to exit terms, our case studies show that
strategic design of direct actions can impose political and practical
impediments to a successor, essentially preventing them from simply
undoing the direct action with the stroke of a pen.
A key research question for further consideration is how the
courts might weigh in on the default rules of presidential exit. For
example, the ensuing litigation over President Trump’s efforts to
shrink national monuments may produce a judicial default rule for
instances in which a statute delegating direct-action authority is silent
with regard to exit. And the conflicting case law on the status of
agencies when presidents delegate them a role in the exercise of directaction authority, such as the State Department for oil pipeline
presidential permits, suggests the need for increased clarity on whether
their actions are “presidential” or “administrative” for purposes of
judicial review.
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Indeed, the fact that these fronts of litigation over presidential exit
are relevant today suggests that this Article has by no means exhausted
what can be said or studied about presidential exit. Although it has long
been a part of White House dynamics, President Trump’s
unconventional and symbolic presidential exit strategy has uncovered
the neglect of presidential exit as a topic of legal scholarship and the
need to fill that gap with coherent theory and application. We are
hopeful our treatment of the topic provides a foundation for moving
forward with that research agenda.

